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BARRED FROM THE VOTE:
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
OF FELONS
Brian Pinaire*
Milton Heumann**
Laura Bilotta***
In the United States, except for slaves, servants, and paupers fed
by the township, no one is without a vote and, hence, an indirect
share in lawmaking.1
-Alexis de Tocqueville
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government.2
-Reynolds v. Sims
INTRODUCTION
If ex-felons had been able to vote in Florida during the presiden-
tial election of 2000, several scholars and commentators tell us, Al
Gore would have defeated George W. Bush by between 10,000 and
85,000 votes.3 According to the best available estimates, Florida's
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Lehigh University; B.A.,
Whitman College, 1997; Ph.D., Rutgers University, 2003.
** Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University;
B.A., Brooklyn College, 1968; M.Phil., Yale University, 1970; Ph.D., Yale University,
1974.
*** J.D. candidate, New York University School of Law, 2005; B.A., Rutgers Uni-
versity, 2002.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 240 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1988) (1966).
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
3. Nicholas Thompson, Locking up the Vote, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at
17, 21. Most recently, Sasha Abramsky, a media fellow at the Open Society Institute's
Center on Crime, Communities, and Culture, has offered the conservative estimate
that if Gore had earned 60% of the vote from those who had been denied the vote, he
would have won the state of Florida and, thus, the presidential election. Sasha
Abramsky, A Growing Gap in American Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at
A23. Further, in a more comprehensive study, sociologists Jeff Manza and Christo-
pher Uggen project that turnout by felons would be close to one-third in presidential
elections, and they predict that between 70 and 90% of former or current felons
would vote Democratic. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF MANZA, THE POLITICAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF FELONY DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2001),
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law, which for all practical purposes bars all ex-felons from ever
voting again,4 kept over 525,000 people, 5% of the state's voting
age population, away from the polls during this last presidential
election.5 Nationally, according to the scholars at The Sentencing
Project, 6 an estimated 3.9 million U.S. citizens (one in fifty adults)
are disenfranchised, including over one million who have fully
completed their sentences.7 Perhaps most startling, 13% of Afri-
can-American men in the United States (1.4 million) are disen-
franchised, representing over 36% of the total disenfranchised
population.'
This Essay explores a surprisingly understudied issue: public atti-
tudes toward the disenfranchisement of felons. While forty-eight
available at http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/papers/2000/disfranchise.
pdf (last visited July 15, 2003). The impact of these policies on past and present elec-
tions is, therefore, quite significant. See Audrey Chambers, Vote of Felons, Ex-Felons
Would Have Changed Election Outcomes, 22 INST. POL'Y RES. NEWS, Nw. UNIV.,
Spring 2001, at 3, available at http://www.northwestern.edu/IPR/publications/newslet-
ter/iprn0106/felons.html (last visited July 15, 2003).
For example, these scholars suggest that if as many individuals were incarcerated
and disenfranchised in 1960 as are today, John F. Kennedy would have lost the presi-
dential election to Richard M. Nixon. Additionally, Uggen and Manza argue, seven
Senate elections between 1970 and 1998 would have been overturned, and the Demo-
crats would have controlled the Senate throughout the 1990s. UGGEN & MANZA,
supra, at 16, 19, 24; Chambers, supra, at 1. But, while the repeal of disenfranchise-
ment laws would clearly benefit the Democrats, even the neoconservative social theo-
rist James Q. Wilson concludes that a "perpetual loss of the right to vote serves no
practical or philosophical purpose." Thompson, supra, at 21.
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.052 (West 2002). While every state has some process in
place for restoring the right to vote, the process is generally so convoluted and com-
plicated that it is rarely carried out.
5. Julie Kay & Michael D. Goldhaber, Florida Has More Nonvoting Ex-Felons
Than Any Other State So Expect A Battle, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. REV., Dec. 1,
2000, at B.
6. "The Sentencing Project is a non-profit organization which promotes de-
creased reliance on incarceration and increased use of more effective and humane
alternatives. It is a nationally known source of criminal justice policy analysis, data
and program information." The Sentencing Project, at http://www.sentencingproject.
org/about/about.html (last visited July 15, 2003).
7. PATRICIA ALLARD & MARC MAUER, REGAINING THE VOTE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF ACTIVITY RELATING TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs/regainvote.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003); THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
(FACT SHEET) 1 (2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/pub1046.
pdf (last visited July 15, 2003); see JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENC-
ING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/
vote/ (last visited July 15, 2003).
8. ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 7, at 2; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note
7, at 1; see FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 7, at 1.
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states restrict (or revoke entirely) the right of felons to vote,9 there
is remarkably little social scientific discussion of the rationale, ef-
fects, and public understanding or acceptance of felony disen-
franchisement. Law review articles discuss justifications and legal
strategy,10 and some social scientists have begun to assess the im-
pact of these laws nationwide.1' Our survey data represent the first
comprehensive assessment of public support for laws and practices
of this sort.
Curiosity caused us to embark upon this project. While our pre-
liminary research involved a review of state laws and legislative
histories, we then assessed the public's understanding of, and sup-
port for, these practices. Do Americans even know about these
laws? Do the laws "speak" for the people in this sense? And, per-
haps most importantly, can we identify the reasoning that upholds
these public attitudes?
Americans, we assumed, generally value "justice" and "rights"
and expect the legal system to protect both. Yet, there is, in
America, also a commitment to notions of personal responsibility
and citizenship;12 implying that rights compel duties, and those who
violate the rules of the social order are punished accordingly. 13
Thus, we believed that most would accept the idea that those who
"do the crime" should "do the time." But, we wondered, what
happens when the "time" is up? Would support remain for contin-
uing to punish those who served their sentences and were returned
to society as free citizens?
We begin with an overview of various state laws, the significant
legal and political issues they implicate, and the impact of these
practices. We then move to a discussion of our primary research
questions, theory, and methods, and subsequently to a discussion
of our findings. Finally, we explore the policy implications of this
research and propose directions for future study.
I. OVERVIEW: LAWS, ISSUES, AND IMPACT
Currently, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia disen-
franchise convicted felons during some phase of the criminal justice
9. Vermont and Maine do not restrict the rights of felons to vote. UGGEN &
MANZA, supra note 3, at 4 n.2.
10. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons: One Person, No Vote:
The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1957-58 (2002).
11. See UGGEN & MANZA, supra note 3, at 2.
12. Edith Jones, The Nature of Man According to the Supreme Court, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 237, 242-43 (1999).
13. Id.
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process.14 Thirty-two of these states prohibit felons from voting
while they are on parole and twenty-eight exclude felony proba-
tioners as well. 5 Perhaps most significant, thirteen states perma-
nently disenfranchise some or all ex-felons. 16 Eight states
permanently and categorically revoke the right to vote for all of-
fenders, even those who have completed all aspects of their
sentences, four other states permanently disenfranchise some ex-
offenders,17 and one state withholds the franchise right from some
ex-felons for a period of five years upon completion of their
sentence. 18
TABLE 1
STATE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
1 9
State Prison Probation Parole Ex-Felons
Alabama •
Alaska 0
Arizona 0 020
Arkansas ,
California 0
Colorado •
Connecticut 0
Delaware 0 o21
District of Columbia 0
Florida 0 0 0
Georgia 0 •
Hawaii
Idaho 0
Illinois 0
Indiana •
Iowa 0 0 0 0
Kansas 0
Kentucky 0 0 0
Louisiana
Maine
14. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 7, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Table 1 is adapted from THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 7, at 3.
20. Applies only after the second felony conviction.
21. In 2000, the General Assembly restored the voting rights of certain ex-felons
five years after the completion of their sentence. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; see
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 7, at 6.
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Maryland • 22
Massachusetts 0
Michigan •
Minnesota *
Mississippi *
M issouri * 0 •
Montana •
Nebraska • 0 •
Nevada 0 0 • •
New Hampshire •
New Jersey • 0
New Mexico 0 0
New York 0
North Carolina 0 0 0
North Dakota •
Ohio •
Oklahoma * *
Oregon *
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island 0 0 *
South Carolina • 0
South Dakota •
Tennessee • *23
Texas * * •
Utah
Vermont
Virginia 0 0 • •
Washington 0 o24
West Virginia 0 0
Wisconsin 0 0 0
Wyoming 0 0 0 •
U.S. Total 49 28 32 13
22. Recently, Maryland repealed its voting ban for two-time ex-felons (except for
those with two violent felony convictions), and imposed a three-year waiting period
upon completion of the sentence before the right to vote is restored to felons. THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 7, at 2.
23. Applies only to felonies committed prior to 1986.
24. Applies only to felonies committed prior to 1984.
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While each state has developed a system for restoring voting
rights to ex-offenders, the restoration process is usually so compli-
cated and cumbersome that it is rarely utilized.25
The tradition of denying criminals the right to vote, a practice
with roots in the Greek and Roman eras,26 is a vestige of the medi-
eval practice of "civil death," wherein offenders were banished
from the political community. 2 The laws disenfranchising con-
victed felons that were in place after the revolutionary war in many
states28 took on a new and more pernicious significance after the
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, an
amendment that gave African-American males the right to vote. 29
The right to vote has been withheld from many citizens throughout
the history of this nation; women,30 the illiterate, 31 and the prop-
erty-less 32 were denied suffrage along with African-Americans. 33
In the era following Reconstruction, southern opposition and re-
25. The United States Department of Justice has referred to this phenomenon as
"a national crazy-quilt of disqualifications and restoration procedures." See OFFICE
OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CON-
VICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY ii (1996).
Alabama, for example, requires that ex-offenders provide a DNA sample to the
Alabama Department of Forensic Services as one part of the process of regaining the
vote. ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 7, at 5. In Florida, clemency is granted only if
the governor and three of his cabinet members consent. Additionally, Florida's six-
teen-page application asks for information such as the date of birth of all persons with
whom the applicant may have had a child out of wedlock, the cause of death of the
applicant's parents, and the name and purpose of any organizations to which the ap-
plicant belongs. Nicholas Thompson, Locking up the Vote, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1,
2001, at 17.
At the federal level, Representative John Conyers and thirty-seven co-sponsors
have introduced the Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act, which seeks to re-
store federal voting rights to persons who have been released from incarceration,
even if they are prohibited from participating in state elections. Civic Participation
and Rehabilitation Act, H.R. 906, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
26. Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and the
"Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1989).
27. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 7, at 1; Note, Challenging Criminal Disen-
franchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 562
(1993); Alec Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Laws in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1045.
28. To Secure the Federal Voting Rights of Persons Who Have Been Released from
Incarceration: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 4 (1999) (testimony of Todd F. Gaziano, Senior Fellow in Legal Studies, The
Heritage Foundation).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
30. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD C. HASEN, ELECTION LAW 26 (2d ed.
2001).
31. Id. at 31.
32. Id. at 26-27.
33. Id. at 28.
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sentment led to the creation of numerous voting barriers, aimed
specifically at African-Americans.34
Poll taxes,35 grandfather clauses,36 and property tests37 were
common (and ostensibly race-neutral); but, many southern states
instituted new forms of "Jim Crow" legislation meant to target Af-
rican-Americans in particular, with the intention of disqualifying
them from the vote.38 The racial impact of these laws, especially in
the south, is staggering. Ten states disenfranchise more than one in
five adult African-American men,39 while in seven of those states,
one in four African-American men is permanently disen-
franchised.40 Furthermore, in two states, Alabama and Florida,
31% of all African-American men are permanently
disenfranchised.41
There are two basic theoretical justifications offered by courts
and commentators for the disenfranchisement of felons. One is
that the commission of a felony constitutes a violation of the "so-
cial contract. ' 42 The other is that such an offense demonstrates an
inability to abide by the moral requirements of civic republican-
ism. 43 According to traditional social contract rationale, freely
34. Id. at 28-32.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 26-27.
38. Disenfranchisement laws were tailored to include crimes that African-Ameri-
cans were allegedly more likely to commit. It was the case in South Carolina, as but
one example, that "the disqualifying crimes were those to which [the Negro] was es-
pecially prone: thievery, adultery, arson, wife-beating, housebreaking, and attempted
rape. Such crimes as murder and fighting, to which the white man was as disposed as
the Negro, were significantly omitted from the list." FELLNER & MAUER, supra note
7, at 2.
The 1890 constitutional convention of the state of Mississippi replaced an 1869 pro-
vision disenfranchising felons convicted of "any crime" with more specific language
that emphasized crimes that African-Americans were estimated to be more likely to
commit (i.e., bribery, bigamy, theft). The racist intentions of these "adjustments"
could not have been expressed any clearer than by John Fielding Burns, author of the
Alabama constitutional provision disenfranchising particular criminals, who "esti-
mated the crime of wife-beating alone would disqualify sixty-percent of the Negroes."
Andrew Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights
Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 1, 1-25 (1993).
39. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 7, at 2.
40. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 7, at 1 (citing FELLNER & MAUER,
supra note 7, at 2).
41. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 7, at 2, 8.
42. See id.
43. Ewald, supra note 27, at 1048. In his discussion of the relationship between
these traditions and felony disenfranchisement laws, Ewald presents a helpful, theo-
retically rich argument that simultaneously finds support and tension within the
American political tradition regarding the justifications proposed for permanent dis-
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choosing individuals begin from an original bargaining position and
design a system of neutral arrangements that will protect and pro-
mote their basic rights and interests. Central to this reasoning is
the idea that all people have basic needs and that they form a com-
munity and institute rules of governance in order to provide secur-
ity and a structure that will allow them to enjoy their liberty.44 A
violation of the terms of the "contract" disrupts the balance of
rights and responsibilities, invites a punitive response according to
pre-determined rules, and essentially (at least temporarily) strips
the individual of her right to participate in the political process.4 5
The civic republican rationale for disenfranchisement is
animated by a concern for the moral character of the political com-
munity and specifically the virtue of its members.46 A polis, in
other words, is only as well-ordered as the moral compass directing
its citizen-components.47 Thus, rather than emphasizing the choice
inherent in the liberal, contractarian model above, civic republican-
ism embraces the political fitness, quality and essence of its mem-
bers, and therefore, their capacity to conceive of and act toward
the common good.48 As a result, it is not so much that a violation
enfranchisement. More specifically, Ewald borrows the idea of "multiple traditions"
from Rogers Smith. ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 35-39 (1997). Smith proposed
that "American political actors have always promoted civic ideologies that blend lib-
eral, democratic, republican, and inegalitarian ascriptive elements in various combina-
tions designed to be politically popular," and argues that a combination of liberal
(contract-oriented), civic republican (virtue-oriented), and racially discriminatory ide-
ologies has sustained this kind of legislation, even while principles within liberalism
(of the modern kind) and republicanism seem to be at odds with such practices. Id.
44. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 117-29 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1996) (1660); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269-78 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1690); MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT 1-54 (1996); Ewald, supra note 27, at 1073.
Chapters 17 and 18 of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan first expressed a vision of this
kind of contract arrangement, though John Locke's emphasis on liberty and property
(as opposed to merely security, for example), best represents the American applica-
tion of "contract" reasoning. See, specifically, Locke's discussion of "the state of Na-
ture" in Chapter 2 of his "Second Treatise on Government." LOCKE, supra, at 287-96.
45. Expressing social contract reasoning of this sort, Judge Henry Friendly of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained "[a] man who breaks
the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have
been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further administering the
compact." Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
46. See, e.g., FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 7, at 1.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 167-218 (1985); SANDEL, supra note 44, at 1-
54; Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547-58 (1988).
Washington v. State, a commonly-cited case, articulates the civic republican vision and
the rationale for disenfranchising felons:
1526
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earns you time in the proverbial "penalty box," but rather that you
no longer exude the qualities of a good and right "team player,"
and thus no longer deserve a spot on the roster.
In two significant voting rights cases within the last three de-
cades, the United States Supreme Court considered these different
strands of reasoning as it upheld the constitutionality of laws that
disenfranchise convicted felons.49 While the Court has called the
right to vote "fundamental,"5 making it clear that "no right is
more precious in a free country,"51 and while it has famously as-
serted that the "right to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice is the essence of a democratic society, '52 the Supreme Court
has failed to extend this guarantee to convicted felons.
In the first major challenge of felony disenfranchisement laws to
reach the Court, Richardson v. Ramirez,53 Justice Rehnquist, later
Chief Justice, authored a majority opinion that upheld a California
law denying ex-felons the right to vote.54 For the majority, Section
The manifest purpose [of denying suffrage to ex-convicts] is to preserve the
purity of the ballot box, which is the only sure foundation of republican lib-
erty, and which needs protection against the invasion of corruption, just as
much as against that of ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. The evil infection
of the one is not more fatal than that of the other. The presumption is, that
one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indica-
tive of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or
to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are clothed by the
State with the toga of political citizenship.
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884). The classic example portraying this
manner of political exclusion, as a means of preventing corruption and preserving the
moral vigor of a community, can be found in the trial of Socrates. PLATO, THE TRIAL
AND DEATH OF SOCRATES (Shane Weller ed., B. Jowett trans., Dover Publ'ns, Inc.
1992).
49. In his discussion of the institutional and historical development of American
citizenship laws, Rogers Smith offers an interesting discussion of what appears to be
the earliest African-American voting rights case to reach the United States Supreme
Court, Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). Specifically, Smith notes that,
while Mississippi's registration requirements were, according to the State Supreme
Court, "aimed at exploiting various 'weaknesses' of blacks, they were constitutional
[for the U.S. Supreme Court] because 'on their face,' at least, they applied to 'weak
and vicious white men as well.'" SMITH, supra note 43, at 451.
50. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
51. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
52. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
53. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
54. See id. at 54-56. Ramirez involved three California ex-felons who were incar-
cerated and had completed their parole. Id. at 26. The California Supreme Court had
reversed the decision of election officials who refused to let the ex-felons register to
vote and held that the state's disenfranchising law violated the Equal Protection
clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 27. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the California court, finding that the law did not, on its face, violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and remanded the case to
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1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from deny-
ing persons equal protection of the laws, must be read in light of
Section 2 of the amendment, which implies that states have the ca-
pacity to disenfranchise those who participate in "rebellion, or
other crime.' 55 Read this way, the traditional "strict scrutiny"
standard of Section 1 "could not have been meant to bar outright a
form of disenfranchisement ' 56 which "has an affirmative sanction
in § 2.''1 7
In his dissent, Justice Marshall was quick to realize the potential
for extreme abuses of discretion if the phrase "other crimes" was to
be so loosely interpreted.5 8 "Absurd results" could follow, accord-
ing to Justice Marshall, if the states were granted the authority to
give meaning to such an open-ended concept, legitimating disen-
franchisement for seduction under promise to marry, conspiracy to
operate a motor vehicle without a muffler, vagrancy, breaking a
water pipe, or even jaywalking or a traffic conviction, "since § 2
does not differentiate between felonies and misdemeanors. '59
Eleven years later, however, in an Alabama case, the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to put an important limitation on the
"other crime" doctrine established in Ramirez. In Hunter v. Un-
derwood,60 the Court unanimously declared that "§ 2 was not de-
the California courts to consider whether the law was applied with "such a total lack
of uniformity" that it violated the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 56.
55. Id. at 42. Before Ramirez, the Supreme Court had summarily affirmed lower
court decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to state laws disenfranchising con-
victed felons. See, e.g., Fincher v. Scott, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Beacham v. Braterman,
396 U.S. 12 (1969). The relevant part of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution reads:
[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
56. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55.
57. Id. at 54.
58. Id. at 73-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 75 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Some states actually do disenfranchise
citizens who commit these offenses. For example, Alabama disenfranchises offenders
convicted of vagrancy and North Dakota disenfranchises offenders convicted of
breaking a water pipe. Gary Reback, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassess-
ment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 846 (1973). In Otsuka v. Hite, the Supreme Court of
California noted that California could disenfranchise offenders convicted of seduction
under promise of marriage or conspiracy to operate a motor vehicle without a muf-
fler. 414 P.2d 412, 418 (Cal. 1966).
60. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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signed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination . . .which
otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."61 This case
involved two plaintiffs, one African-American and one white, who
had been prohibited from voting because each had been convicted
of passing bad checks, a misdemeanor of "moral turpitude" accord-
ing to the Alabama Attorney General.62 In federal court, the
plaintiffs asserted that section 182 of the Alabama Constitution vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause because it was adopted with
intent to discriminate against African-Americans and was, in fact,
fulfilling its intended effect.63 The Supreme Court agreed, in an-
other opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, finding substantial evi-
dence of discriminatory intent and impact and furthermore
concluding that the provision would not have been adopted absent
the impermissible intent.64 Importantly, therefore, in this case, the
Court explained that while felony disenfranchisement laws were
not unconstitutional on their face, they could be unconstitutional
as applied, if it could be proven that racial discrimination was a
"substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the enactment of a
challenged law.65
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Overview
As an exploratory research project, this Study generates more
hypotheses than it tests. We began with a few basic questions and
expectations that were based on previous studies of public opinion
regarding controversial civil liberties issues,66 with the hope of pro-
viding a foundation for future scholarship on this issue.67 Our data,
61. Id. at 224.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 227.
64. Id. at 230-31. As the Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of
the State of Alabama (1901) indicate, one delegate involved in the adoption of the
disputed section at the 1901 convention claimed "[e]verybody knows that this Con-
vention has done its best to disenfranchise the Negro in Alabama." Andrew L. Sha-
piro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New
Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 548 (1993).
65. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228.
66. James W. Prothro & Charles M. Grigg, Fundamental Principles of Democracy:
Bases of Agreement and Disagreement, 22 J. POL. 276, 282-91 (1960).
67. Because this Study focuses on controversial political questions as well-mea-
suring public attitudes regarding a specific right at the heart of our democracy, while
situating this inquiry within a more global investigation of the peoples' views on vari-
ous issues-the summary of findings offered by Prothro and Grigg are especially in-
triguing: "As expected, general consensus was found on the idea of democracy itself
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we believe, raise questions about the justness and public support
for existing practices, while enriching our understanding of the
public's views of the criminal justice system and introducing a new
set of concerns, questions, and complications for policymakers and
scholars in several fields.
Legitimate concerns might be raised, and state interests could be
rationalized, for the temporary disenfranchisement of felons, dur-
ing some stage of the process. But, in a nation that professes faith
in the democratic process, can the permanent disenfranchisement
of felons be justified? Does the public support such practices? If
so, based on what reasoning? That is, if most Americans feel that
justice has been served when the sentence is completed (if you "do
the crime," you "do the time") then why is it that more than one-
fourth of American states (thirteen) 68 maintain legislation that dis-
enfranchises some or all ex-felons for life? 69 If we trust offenders
enough to release them back into society, can we justify not re-
turning to them the full rights and privileges of political
citizenship?
But, if the public does in fact support lifetime disenfranchise-
ment, does this suggest that the "debt" has not been paid once the
time is served? Does it suggest that "the system" is too "soft" on
crime? Does it suggest that Americans hold dear to some notion
of the social contract, or civic republicanism, and thus believe that
ex-felons have, by their actions, demonstrated that they are not
good citizens or cannot be trusted? Alternatively, if the public
does not support these laws, or the basic notion of disenfranchise-
ment (temporary or permanent), what does this tell us about the
staying power of this kind of legislation? That is, if there is not
public support for these practices, should the draconian denial of
vote provisions remain "on the books?"
B. Theory
We began this research expecting conclusions similar to those
drawn by Prothro and Grigg in their seminal study of public sup-
port for the protection of civil liberties, generally, and the preser-
and on the broad principles of majority rule and minority rights, but it disappeared
when these principles were put in more specific form." Id. at 291.
68. The thirteen states are: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. See Tbl. 1.
69. George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Ra-
cial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1898 (1999) (stating that felons are
barred from voting for life).
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vation of the freedoms of particular individuals and groups,
specifically.7" That is, in light of American political values, tradi-
tion, culture, and lore, we expected most Americans to support the
basic idea of rights, liberties, and justice. As a social contract soci-
ety that prides itself on the rule of law, this is a logical assumption
to make: the state is created to preserve basic freedoms and to pro-
vide order, security, and stability.
We also expected, however, to see this support wane when con-
sidering the particular sub-category of convicted felons. With
rights come responsibilities, as we imagined the equation playing
out in the minds of the public, and thus, a violation of the law is a
renunciation of one of the essential terms of citizenship. Shirking
responsibility by committing a felony could, under this reasoning,
justify a temporary or permanent restriction of rights (even the
most "fundamental" ones) either for punitive purposes, or simply
because the individual has demonstrated that she cannot be trusted
with such important civic duties.
C. Hypothesis
We expected the "right to vote" to be perceived as one of the
most important rights in a democracy, but we expected public sup-
port for this right to diminish when convicted felons were consid-
ered. The public would accept the concept of disenfranchisement,
we hypothesized, and would justify the practice with a mixture of
both social contract and republican reasoning. We also assumed
public support for disenfranchisement laws, given that forty-eight
states either temporarily or permanently remove the right to vote.
This notion is predicated on the assumption that there is a correla-
tion between laws and positive public attitudes, in the sense that
the people's representatives represent the people's views.71 In
short, felony disenfranchisement laws should be widespread be-
cause of widespread public support for them.
D. Methodology
We used survey research methods to measure public attitudes
toward the disenfranchisement of felons. Our survey asked a vari-
70. Prothro & Grigg, supra note 66, at 276.
71. We realized that this is at least a contested notion of "representation." For the
sake of argument, however, we adhered to this model and felt that, especially given
the close "electoral connection" that exists between the people and their elected
"voices" where issues of crime and criminal justice are concerned, in particular, it was
at least plausible to envision this kind of delegate relationship.
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ety of questions, ranging from basic beliefs about the purpose of
the criminal justice system (i.e., punishment, rehabilitation, deter-
rence), to public attitudes about the treatment and punishment of
felons (i.e., the amount of rights protected, degree of punishment
conferred/time served, fairness of the system), to public support for
the disenfranchisement of felons, including the rationale for such
laws. (See Figure 1 below). Again, our intent was to gauge general
attitudes about the criminal justice system, the rights accorded to
felons, and public support for laws that restrict or remove the right
to vote, including the reasoning that is used to either accept or re-
ject these practices.
These questions were included in a national survey of 503 people
conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the
University of Connecticut. 72 Interviews were conducted by tele-
phone, between May 16 and June 6, 2001, using a Computer As-
sisted Telephone Interviewing ("CATI") system. Professional
survey interviewers, trained in standard protocols for administering
survey instruments, conducted the surveys.
The national sample used for this research project included resi-
dential telephone numbers in the forty-eight contiguous states.
The sample was stratified to insure that broad geographic regions
were represented in proportion to their share of the total adult
population in the United States. Within each of these regions, tele-
phone numbers were generated through a random-digit-dial tele-
phone methodology to insure that each possible residential
telephone number had an equal probability of selection. Tele-
phone banks that contain no known residential telephone numbers
were removed from the sample selection process. Once selected,
each telephone number was contacted a minimum of four times to
attempt to reach an eligible respondent. Households where a via-
ble contact was made were called additional times. Within each
household one adult was randomly selected to complete the
interview.73
72. Center for Survey Research & Analysis at the University of Connecticut, at
http://www.csra.stamford.uconn.edu/research.html (last visited July 15, 2003).
73. This methodology was adapted from the explanation of methodology distrib-
uted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecti-
cut. Our questions were one component of a larger survey project looking at general
public attitudes toward the First Amendment.
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FIGURE 1
SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. In your opinion, is the right to vote:
A. THE most important right in a democracy;
B. One of the most important rights in a democracy;
C. Only somewhat important in a democracy;
D. Not important in a democracy;
E. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
2. When dealing with convicted felons, which of the following should be the most important
goal of the criminal justice system?
A. Punishment of the offender;
B. Rehabilitation of the offender;
C. Deterrence, or discouraging future offenders;
D. Removal of the offender from society;
E. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
3. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement?: "Felons who serve their time
should return to society as full citizens, with full rights and privileges."
A. Strongly agree;
B. Somewhat agree;
C. Somewhat disagree;
D. Strongly disagree;
E. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
4. (If "disagree" in #3) Is this because ...
A. Felons are not punished enough by the criminal justice system?
B. There are some rights that should be revoked permanently?
C. Those who commit felony offenses are not good citizens?
D. All of the above?
E. None of the above / Some other reason?
F. Don't know / Refuse to answer?
5. With respect to convicted felons, do you think they have too many rights, too few rights,
or about the correct amount of rights?
A. Too many;
B. Too few;
C. About the correct amount;
D. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
6. Do you think the criminal justice system is ...
A. Completely fair;
B. Generally fair;
C. Generally unfair;
D. Completely unfair;
E. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
7. Some states either temporarily or permanently revoke a convicted felon's right to vote.
Which of the following statements best represents your view on this matter?
A. Felons should never lose their right to vote;
B. Felons should lose their right to vote only while they are incarcerated;
C. Felons should lose their right to vote only while they are on parole or probation;
D. Felons should lose their right to vote only while they are incarcerated and on parole or
probation;
E. Felons should lose their right to vote while they are incarcerated, on parole or
probation, and the rest of their life;
F. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
8. (If B-F for #7) Which of the following statements best explains your reasons for feeling
this way?
A. Felons are immoral individuals;
B. Felons have proven that they should not be treated as citizens;
C. Felons cannot be trusted;
D. All of the above;
E. None of the above / Some other reason;
F. Don't know / Refuse to answer.
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III. RESULTS
FIGURE 2
SURVEY RESULTS
1. In your opinion, is the right to vote ...
Frequency Percent
1. THE most important right in a democracy; 233 46.3
2. One of the most important rights in a democracy; 236 46.9
3. Only somewhat important in a democracy; 25 5.0
4. Not important in a democracy; 8 1.6
5. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 1 .2
TOTAL 503 100.0
2. When dealing with convicted felons, which of the following should be the most
important goals of the criminal justice system?
Frequency Percent
1. Punishment of the offender; 115 22.9
2. Rehabilitation of the offender; 155 30.8
3. Deterrence, or discouraging future offenders; 88 17.5
4. Removal of the offender from society; 113 22.5
5. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 32 6.4
TOTAL 503 100.0
3. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement?: "Felons who serve
their time should return to society as full citizens, with full rights and
privileges."
Frequency Percent
1. Strongly agree; 114 22.7
2. Somewhat agree; 139 27.6
3. Somewhat disagree; 105 20.9
4. Strongly disagree; 117 23.3
5. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 28 5.6
TOTAL 503 100.0
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4. (If "somewhat" or "strongly" disagree for question #3) Is this because ...
Valid
Frequency Percent Percent
1. Felons are not punished enough by the
criminal justice system? 39 7.8 17.6
2. There are some rights that should be revoked
permanently? 99 19.7 44.6
3. Those who commit felony offenses are not
good citizens? 24 4.8 10.8
4. All of the above? 23 4.6 10.4
5. None of the above / Some other reason? 33 6.6 14.9
6. Don't know / Refuse to answer? 4 .8 1.8
TOTAL 222 44.1 100.0
Missing 281 55.9
TOTAL 503 100.0
5. With respect to convicted felons, do you think they have too many rights, too
few rights, or about the correct amount of rights?
Frequency Percent
1. Too many; 227 45.1
2. Too few; 48 9.5
3. About the correct amount; 182 36.2
4. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 46 9.1
TOTAL 503 100.0
6. Do you think the criminal justice system is ...
Frequency Percent
1. Completely fair; 3 .6
2. Generally fair; 350 69.6
3. Generally unfair; 121 24.1
4. Completely unfair; 24 4.8
5. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 5 1.0
TOTAL 503 100.0
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7. Some states either temporarily or permanently revoke a convicted felon's right
to vote. Which of the following statements best represents your view on this
matter?
Frequency Percent
1. Felons should never lose their right to vote; 50 9.9
2. Felons should lose their right to vote only while they
are incarcerated; 159 31.6
3. Felons should lose their right to vote only while they
are on parole or probation; 25 5.0
4. Felons should lose their right to vote only while they
are incarcerated, on parole, or probation; 177 35.2
5. Felons should lose their right to vote while they are
incarcerated, on parole or probation, and the rest of
their life; 80 15.9
6. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 12 2.4
TOTAL 503 100.0
8. (If answers #2-5 in question #7) Which of the following statements best explains
your reasons for feeling this way?
Valid
Frequency Percent Percent
1. Felons are immoral individuals; 30 6.0 6.8
2. Felons have proven that they should not be
treated as citizens; 144 28.6 32.7
3. Felons cannot be trusted; 89 17.7 20.2
4. All of the above; 30 6.0 6.8
5. None of the above / Some other reason; 137 27.2 31.1
6. Don't know / Refuse to answer. 11 2.2 2.5
TOTAL 441 87.7 100.0
Missing 62 12.3
TOTAL 503 100.0
1536
BARRED FROM THE VOTE
0
0.0
E .2
06
0,0
0)
0.9 00
0C)
.00.
.0
0.
0
0)
E0~0
co
E)
ItN00
t 0 0 0 M C)
CO C
06 Ft - eq
r- 0 ) 0T C1=
000C
C')l 00 \
000
~0
00 " 'to
0
'000 E 0c
o 0--,A -j-
0 N n
0
0
.0
E
0
.2
00
0
2003] 1537
0000 ol00 0
0r- , D - .) W
C-4C)'~ ': )00
r-- 0 q 0, C 00 ~'oa
C') C)M
0) m .j 6 o 1
\0 m 00 "t
0
C00 CD
o,0 - -0t
0)
C, W r- C) 0
In 0
C4i\0 )'uu'1)
\0 0 - C') -q- r-'o
15
0
E
r- C-O000 C
en -- ' 000. 000
00
ON'tqOq 0 0-
.0
cqoc- -0?200000
00 0 U.00
OONC400') ON'.C-4
00
EO00 . 0O 05 2'0
00z
0 CI
m 0
L6 .0. C, < V 00 00
E 
.0E.- ~ oW 0
w a w 0 00 00n
C') fOC4. 0
ON 00 kn00 0 C
m 00-)-CO'
C-4
-D 0C0.0C
00 00 W000
C0 rO- c 000
C, 00 r- r- -'t
00 '0 'TO0
0q 0 .00- -
C') 00 N.-- 00
- C 5') 'R0
=- 7 7 -- 7 0000
\0 0q0 *0,ccI
m 00 . .C-4
0 7 '0 '
0 01 000
.0 E0.00E0
0 "A u ).
.C'> <()
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Q
00
.0 =.
Q00
U
0)'
00
E
") 0
U
1538
00
M C)
00 C,0
00
m0 0
N0Imo '
2 
cq
,i .66r
04 t-)0
r-:r- , .6 -n .
In-M k-
0 - 61
o~So- N.00
0
o 0o000c
000 enC r)0
z
0
p2
0 00 CD0 00 r- N0 ONC4r
qN e -c Nrn In
oen r-n
00-- 0mn
z0 C3en -
enNn 00 N N
00e m 0
~NN~0 N M0 I Inn
N00 C, C) 0 InC C9 c
0en r- 00 -0 ej r n -1 "q
0 M r-0C00 a0 0
0.n0 0 f 0
In 0S 0 m 0 a0
-Itn - 0 In
In e
10 a
NO 0 00 N In 9 c
o) enC' en 6 6 00
C - 00 00 10 -6 mn0 -- en m
>r00 0C M 0000
-0 0 00- v
0
N 0NN 0) N. 0
E W0) Nm 00.-. C 00
0
In00000 0) 'D .
Ew C- e00 en - - e
Z E
N 0
~ O N-O ~ 0 - -0 00
'0-. -
N E 00 .O2 + 0
0
o0 u- 
-
0 r.
* 6 3 '3 0 .) 6 ocy
0 
C
Z0 E~ '0''-' - " 0.
-~ 00
N
- 00
- 00
N
N
~ g
In 00
00
00 en
00 en
00
en N
N N
00 -
00C-.* 0~In N
O 0
O 0
O 0
00
0 00
O In
- 00
00
00
0 en
00
00 0
- N
C~ N
- 00
0
N
00 en
- N
00
N
0~ en
CC N
- 00
In 00
en C-.N N
00 In
00
* CC
00 -
N 00
-~ 0
'0
00 en
en C-.
- .0
0 0
20
E ~
0
0) .~ 0
'0.00
'0o'0c
'0C '0 N
~
0)~0)'0
2003] BARRED FROM THE VOTE 1539
00 C
u 1: 000
t0o-a
r-' Nr 00 -N1
~o
00e
'00'
r4 C-)
o-o
Cq l 0 00
0,0 0 0
6 eq mb
r40
00 ."
C-42
0)
=~0 00
2<z N6
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
IV. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
Of those surveyed, 81.7% feel that, at some point, the right to
vote should be restored to convicted felons. 74 We found no con-
sensus regarding the exact time or phase within the sentence that
the franchise should be returned, but by totaling up those who felt
that felons should never lose the right to vote (9.9%), those who
felt felons should lose the right to vote only while incarcerated
(31.6%), those who felt felons should lose the right to vote only
while on parole or probation (5.0%), and those who felt felons
should lose the right to vote only while incarcerated, or on parole
or probation (35.2%), we are able to conclude that 81.7% of those
surveyed rejected the policy of permanent disenfranchisement for
convicted felons.75
74. This conclusion is consistent with our results from Question 1, regarding the
importance of the right to vote in a democracy. Chi-square analysis shows that race,
party affiliation, and education differences are not statistically significant. It suggests
that American people do have a consensus across racial, gender, party, and education
subgroups that the right to vote is the "most important" or "one of the most impor-
tant" rights in a democracy.
75. We did notice intriguing discrepancies within the various subgroups, regarding
the phase at which the franchise should be returned. The difference in response
among different party affiliations is significant at .05 level. See Tbl. 3 (summarizing
the difference findings for the subgroups). Democrats seem to be evenly divided be-
tween those who advocate "lose the right only while incarcerated" (33.7%) and those
who agree with "incarceration and parole or probation" (33%). Republicans and In-
dependents, however, are more inclined to support "incarceration and parole and
probation" (Republicans at 38.1% and Independents at 40.9%). Republicans demon-
strated the highest percentage of support for lifetime disenfranchisement of any single
subgroup (23.1%), a figure made even more interesting when contrasted against the
responses of Republicans, expressed in Question 1, that the right to vote is "the most
important right in a democracy" (56.7%-a figure that is also the highest percentage
of any subgroup). Thus, Republicans as a group, more than any other, felt that the
right to vote is the most important right, but they are also the group that is most
inclined to take this right away.
The differences in response among people of different racial groups, between Males
and Females, and among people of different educational levels are not significant at
.05 level. But interestingly, the modal (and near majority) response for African-
Americans, for example, was that felons should lose the right to vote "only while
incarcerated" (47.2%). Not a single one of the thirty-six African-Americans surveyed
supported lifetime disenfranchisement. The modal response for Whites on this issue
was "lose the right while incarcerated, on parole, or probation" (33.3%). Finally, it is
worth noting that the modal response for every subgroup was either "only while incar-
cerated" (African-Americans 47.2%, Democrats 33.7%, Grade School or Less 60%,
and Some High School 45.8%) or "while incarcerated and on parole or probation"
(Whites 36.2%, Females 36.9%, Republicans 38.1%, Independents 40.9%, High
School Graduates 34.6%, Some College 37%, College Graduates 37%, and Post Col-
lege 39.1%), with two "ties" between those two responses (Hispanics 33.3% and
Males 33.2%).
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When those that supported temporary or permanent disen-
franchisement were asked why they supported this policy, the valid
modal response was that "felons have proven that they should not
be treated as citizens" (32.7%). Importantly, however, the second
largest single valid response was "None of the above / Some other
reason" (31.1%), suggesting that we perhaps missed a potential
(and popular) option or that a large segment of the public was una-
ble to articulate its reasons for thinking this way.76
Despite the rhetoric we occasionally hear from elected officials
about criminals being "coddled," the American public is, in fact,
evenly split on the issue of rights for convicted felons. While
45.1% of our respondents did say that convicted felons have "too
many" rights, slightly more of those surveyed (45.7%) felt that
these individuals have either "too few" (9.5%) or "about the cor-
rect amount" (36.2%) of rights.7
76. The difference in responses to this question among people of different racial
groups, party affiliations, and educational levels is significant at .05 level. For Whites,
the most popular answer was "felons should not be treated as citizens" (34%); Afri-
can-Americans, however, were least likely to offer this response (19.4%). We dis-
count the negligible percentage of those with some Grade School or Less because this
group included only five respondents. Hispanics seem quite divided on this issue
("felons are immoral individuals" 23.5%, "felons should not be trusted as citizens"
29.4%, "felons cannot be trusted" 29.4%). Political Independents were most likely to
say that felons had shown they could not be treated as citizens (43.3%). This was the
most popular answer for Republicans as well (32.8%), though, for the Democrats, the
most popular answer was "None of the above / Some other reason" (33.3%), a re-
sponse which was the second most popular answer for both Republicans (28.8%) and
Independents (29.8%).
Among different educational groups, the most popular answer, with the exception
of those with "Grade School or Less" and those who are "College Graduates," was
that "felons should not be treated as citizens" ("Some High School" 29.4%, "High
School Graduate" 27.2%, "Some College" 36.8%, "Post College" 42.6%). For Col-
lege Graduates, the modal answer was "None of the above/Nome other reason"
(41%). People with less than some college education seem to be evenly divided be-
tween "felons should not be treated as citizens" and "felons can not be trusted"
("Some High School" 29.4% and 29.4%, respectively, "High School Graduate" 27.2%
and 26.3%, respectively). As the education level increases, there are more people
who respond with "None of the above / Some other reason," while the percentage
choosing "felons can not be trusted" tends to drop.
77. Consistent with the generally greater "law and order" orientation of the Re-
publican Party, it is not surprising that Republicans were most likely to respond that
convicted felons have "too many rights" (59%) (60% of those with some grade
school or less offered this response, but again, with only five respondents, we do not
make as much of this figure). Males and Females offered similar degrees of support
for "too many rights" (43.4% and 46%, respectively), but interestingly, Males were
considerably more likely to answer "too few rights" on this question (38.7%), versus
(8.57%) for Females. As this would suggest then, Females offered a much greater
degree of support for the response "about the correct amount of rights" (34.0%) than
Males (10.6%). No subgroup offered "too few rights" as its modal response. "Too
2003] 1541
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
We found more dissensus in the responses given to our question
pertaining to the general restoration of rights and privileges to
felons who have completed their sentences. Specifically, we found
that slightly more than half of those surveyed (50.3%) either
"Strongly" or "Somewhat agreed" with the statement "Felons who
serve their time should return to society as full citizens, with full
rights and privileges," while (44.2%) either "Somewhat" or
"Strongly disagreed" with this statement.78
When we asked those who disagreed, either "Somewhat" or
"Strongly," why they disagreed, we found that the modal rationale,
overall (44.6%) and for each of the fourteen subgroups (ranging
from a high of 62.5% for Hispanics, to a low of 39.2% for Republi-
cans) 79 was that "there are some rights that should be revoked per-
many rights" was the mode for the following groups: Whites, Males, Females, Repub-
licans, Independents, Grade School or Less, Some High School, High School Gradu-
ates, and Some College, while "about the correct amount of rights" was the modal
answer for the remaining groups: African-Americans, Hispanics, Democrats, College
Graduates, and Post College.
78. The difference among Whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics is statisti-
cally significant. See Tbl. 3. Whites seem to be evenly divided between those that
"strongly agree" (18.9%), "somewhat agree" (28.8%), "somewhat disagree" (21.1%),
and "strongly disagree" (25.5%). By contrast, African-Americans overwhelmingly
expressed the highest rate of "strong agreement" with this statement (55.0%), fol-
lowed by Hispanics (38.8%). Another 25% of African-Americans "somewhat agree"
with this statement; only 5.5% "strongly disagree." The percentage of Hispanics who
offered "strongly disagree" as a response is 22.2%, a percentage much higher than
African-Americans and closer to the percentage of Whites who give such a response.
This suggests that most African-Americans (75%) believe that ex-felons should be
returned as full citizens while Whites and Hispanics are evenly divided between those
who agree ("strongly" or "somewhat") and those who disagree ("strongly" or "some-
what"). The contrast for Whites is 46.9% versus 46.6% and for Hispanics is 49.9%
versus 44.4%. There is no significant difference in the responses between Males and
Females, those of different party affiliations, or those at different educational levels at
.05 level. Interestingly, however, and consistent with their responses to other ques-
tions, Republicans expressed the lowest rate of "strong agreement" (14.9%).
79. The results show there is no significant difference in response to this question
among different racial groups, party affiliations, or educational levels at .05 level. The
most popular answer was "some rights should be permanently revoked" (Whites 44%,
African-Americans 42.9%, Hispanics 62.5%, Democrats 46.3%, Republicans 39.2%,
Independents 47%, Some High School 54.5%, High School Graduates 40.6%, Some
College 47.3%, College Graduates 47.5%, Post College 42.3%). One point worth not-
ing is that Republicans expressed the lowest percentage of support for the permanent
revocation-of-rights-reasoning, because, as a group, they expressed the highest degree
of support for the position that "felons are not punished enough by the criminal jus-
tice system" (27.0%). There is a significant difference between Male and Female re-
sponses regarding this question at .05 level. The most popular response, however, for
both of these two subgroups is "some rights should be permanently revoked" (Males
41.1%, Females 47%). The difference probably lies in the second popular response:
"some other reason" for Males (21.1%) and "felons are not punished enough" for
Females (21.2%).
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manently." Interestingly, on this question, respondents did not
base their "disagreement" with the above statement on the fact
that "felons are not good citizens," a reason, again, which was the
most popular response offered by those who supported tempora-
rily or permanently disenfranchising felons (Question 8).
Of those surveyed, 70.2% feel the criminal justice system is "com-
pletely" or "generally fair." But, when we look at the numbers for
specific subgroups, we see some striking contrasts. Most subgroups
feel that the system is "generally fair" and express this in the 60-
70% range. As we might expect, however, African-Americans
(52.7%), Hispanics (55.6%), and those with some high school
(54.2%) were less inclined to find the system "generally fair."
Conversely, those with the greatest amount of education (post col-
lege) were most likely to find the system "generally fair" (84.0%). 80
Finally, when asked what the goal of the criminal justice should
be, the overall modal response was "rehabilitation" (30.8%).81
"Rehabilitation," as a response, ranged from a high of 52.7% for
African-Americans, to a low of 15.7% for Republicans and was the
modal response for Whites, African-Americans, Males, Females,
Democrats, Independents, those with some high school, high
school graduates, college graduates, and those with post college ed-
ucation, while "punishment" was the most popular response for
80. The difference between people of various racial groups, between Males and
Females, and between persons of different party affiliations is not significant at .05
level. The most popular answer for Whites (70.9%), African-Americans (52.7%), and
Hispanics (55.6%) is "generally fair" and the second most popular answer is "gener-
ally unfair" (Whites 20.8%, African Americans 38.9%, and Hispanics 38.9%). For
both Males and Females, the most popular answer is "generally fair" (Males 67.6%,
Females 70.8%) and the second most popular answer is "generally unfair" (Males
23.8%, Females 24.2%). For Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike, the
most popular answer is "generally fair" (Democrats 69.9%, Republicans 77.6%, In-
dependents 65.5%) and the second most popular answer is "generally unfair" (Demo-
crats 24%, Republicans 17.9%, Independents 27%). The difference in people's
feelings about the fairness of the criminal justice system, across different educational
levels, is significant at .05 level. The most popular answer for all groups is "generally
fair" (Grade School 60%, Some High School 54.2%, High School Graduates 66.7%,
Some College 65.4%, College Graduates 73%, Post College 84%) and the second
most popular answer is "generally unfair" (Grade School 20%, Some High School
29.2%, High School Graduates 25%, Some College 29.1%, College Graduates 22.2%,
and Post College 15.9%). It is worth noting that those who are College Graduates
and those who have post-college education are more inclined to think the system is
"generally fair" (73% and 84%, respectively).
81. Another recent survey found that "four in ten [Americans] believe the main
purpose of prison is rehabilitation, rather than deterrence, punishment, or the protec-
tion of society." Am. Civil Liberties Union, Surprising Shift: New ACLU Poll Finds
Public Dissatisfied with Lock-Em-Up Approach, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://
www.aclu.org/prisons/prisons.cfm?ID=9439&C=26 (last visited July 15, 2003).
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENCE FINDINGS
Subgroups
Questions Race Gender Party Education
QI: The Right to Vote * * * *
Q2: The Goal of the Criminal Justice System S * S *
Q3: Felons Returning as Full Citizens S * * *
04: Reasons for Disagreement * I * *
Q5: Rights of Convicted Felons S S S S
Q6: The Fairness of the Criminal Justice System * * * S
Q7: Revocation of Voting Rights/Degree of
Disenfranchisement * * S *
Q8: Reasons for Disenfranchisement S * S S
S: The difference within the subgroup is significant at .05 level.
*: The difference within the subgroup is not significant at .05 level.
Hispanics (at a high of 50%), Republicans, those with grade school
or less, and those with some college education.82
V. DISCUSSION
It would be convenient if our findings demonstrated clear public
attitudes toward felony disenfranchisement. Perhaps because this
is an exploratory study--but more likely because of the underlying
82. The differences within subgroups are worth noting. Chi-square analysis shows
that there is significant difference in Whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics' un-
derstanding of the goals of the criminal justice system. While the most popular an-
swer for Whites (28.5%) and African-Americans (52.7%) is "rehabilitation," one half
of Hispanics (50%) think "punishment" is the goal. In addition, Whites are the racial
subgroup most divided on this issue: while 28.5% chose "rehabilitation," 22.1% of-
fered "punishment" as the goal; 20.8% stated that "deterrence" was the goal; and
21.8% thought that "removal from society" was the purpose of the criminal justice
system. African-Americans and Hispanics, however, have more consensus on this
matter. For African-Americans, the percentage answering "rehabilitation," "punish-
ment," "removal from society," and "deterrence" was 52.7%, 25%, 11.1%, and 5.5%,
respectively. For Hispanics, the percentage answering "rehabilitation," "punish-
ment," "removal from society," and "deterrence" was 27.7%, 50%, 16.6%, and 5.5%,
respectively. There is also a significant difference regarding the goal of the criminal
justice system among the various party affiliations. For Democrats and Independents,
the most popular answer (36.2% for Democrats, 35.2% for Independents) was "reha-
bilitation"; but for the Republicans, the most popular answer was "punishment"
(29%). The second most popular answer was the same for Democrats and Republi-
cans: 24% of the Democrats and 27.6% of the Republicans agree that "removal from
the society" was the goal. Independents, however, with the exception of those an-
swering "rehabilitation" (35.2%), seem to be quite evenly divided among "punish-
ment" (19.6%), "deterrence" (18.9%), and "removal from the society" (18.9%).
There was no significant difference regarding this question between Males and Fe-
males and among different educational levels at .05 level.
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complexity in public attitudes-we find no simple picture. These
findings both clarify and complicate our understanding of public
attitudes toward the disenfranchisement of felons, the criminal jus-
tice system, and the general place of felons in our society. Specifi-
cally, we offer the following observations for discussion.
We believe these data demonstrate that the American public
does not support the permanent disenfranchisement of convicted
felons. Again, 81.7% of those surveyed support the return of the
franchise at some point during the serving of the sentence; and
while we discovered no consensus regarding the exact point at
which the right to vote should be returned, we found that only
15.9% of the public supports lifetime disenfranchisement. Con-
versely, however, we found even less support (9.9%) for policies
that never restricted or rescinded felons' voting rights. Less than
one-tenth of our respondents, in other words, felt that felons
should retain their right to vote during all phases of their sentence
(incarceration, probation, parole). Thus, these data suggest that
the majority of Americans are somewhere in the middle. Rela-
tively few favor a policy that never punishes felons with a tempo-
rary deprivation of their right to vote, and only slightly more favor
a policy that permanently punishes felons with a deprivation of
their right to vote. Public opinion, therefore, is solidly consistent
with the laws of the thirty-five states (plus the District of Colum-
bia) that restrict the right to vote during incarceration and/or pa-
role or probation, while public attitudes are, by contrast,
overwhelmingly opposed to the policies of the two states that never
disenfranchise, and the thirteen that permanently disenfranchise
convicted felons.83
As public awareness of these laws increases-especially owing to
the impact of the Florida law on the election of 2000 and the in-
crease in scholarly attention-we expect our findings to encourage
even more rigorous scrutiny of state legislation that permanently
revokes the voting rights of convicted felons. As the effects of dis-
enfranchisement policies receive greater publicity and as the laws
are reevaluated, however, we expect the debate over these issues
to become increasingly partisan, especially as Democrats are ex-
83. Because our data is derived from a national survey, we are unable to address
the degree of support for specific policies within particular states. That is, while the
American public, generally, is overwhelmingly opposed to lifetime disenfranchise-
ment, our data cannot answer, for example, whether Alabamans or Floridians support
this policy. Likewise, we are unable to determine whether the residents of Vermont
and Maine support the policy in their respective states that never restricts felons' vot-
ing rights.
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pected to be the beneficiaries of such an extension of the franchise.
Because we have shown that a supermajority of the American pub-
lic is opposed to this form of permanent political "banishment," we
expect our findings to make an important contribution to the de-
bates, at the state and federal level, over these policies in the fu-
ture. Put simply, we believe these data indicate that the American
people accept the idea of losing the right to vote while behind
"bars" (in a general sense), but overwhelmingly reject the practice
of permanently "barring" felons from the vote.
One of the more striking aspects of our Study is the significance
of race and party affiliation in the respondents' answers to our
questions. Most remarkable, we believe, was the difference in re-
sponses between Whites, Hispanics, and African-Americans re-
garding the purpose of the criminal justice system, the appropriate
treatment for felons who have returned to society, and the degree
and duration of disenfranchisement for those convicted of felony
offenses. Recall that not one of the thirty-six African-American
respondents in our study supported lifetime disenfranchisement, a
finding that is consistent with African-American respondents'
more general inclinations toward "rehabilitation" as the goal of the
criminal justice system (52.7%-more than twice the percentage
for whites or Hispanics), and their disposition toward returning ex-
felons to society "with full rights and privileges" (55%). When we
consider the fact that African-Americans are more likely than
whites to think the criminal justice system is "generally unfair"
(38.9%), we see evidence that the racist origins and intentions of
many of these disenfranchisement laws have translated into direct
and disproportionate impact in terms of subgroups' attitudes.
In terms of the influence of political party affiliation, and with an
eye to the future of public policy within the states that disen-
franchise ex-felons, we feel it is important to note the significant
differences between Democrats' and Republicans' views on the
goal of the criminal justice system, the degree of rights for con-
victed felons, the duration of the disenfranchisement, and the rea-
sons supporting this revocation of voting rights. To state the policy
implications succinctly, we infer from these data that state with Re-
publican-dominated legislatures will be less likely to liberalize ex-
isting disenfranchisement policies. Recall that Republican
respondents in our study were more likely to feel that "punish-
ment" (29%) and the "removal of the offender from society"
(27.6%) were the goals of the criminal justice system; they were
most likely to feel that convicted felons have "too many rights"
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(59%); they were the political affiliation most likely to support life-
time disenfranchisement (23.1); and, of those that supported disen-
franchisement, they were slightly more likely than Democrats to
reason that "felons should not be treated as citizens" (32.8%).
While Democratic respondents offered similar sentiments in some
cases, it is significant to note that members of this party were more
inclined toward "rehabilitation" (36.2%), more likely to feel that
convicted felons have "too few" rights (16.4%), and less supportive
of lifetime disenfranchisement (11.2%). Democrats, we con-
clude-while perhaps not as energetically supportive of ex-felons'
voting rights as advocates for change would hope for-do seem
more receptive to liberalizing state disenfranchisement laws than
Republicans.84
What complicates the conclusions arrived at in this discussion is
the fact that we found considerable dissensus regarding the restora-
tion of full rights, privileges, and credentials of citizenship for
felons, in general.85 That is, we found the public to be nearly
evenly divided on the notion that felons who have served their time
"should return to society as full citizens, with full rights and privi-
leges." Recall that 50.3% of those surveyed either "somewhat" or
"strongly agreed" with this statement, while 44.2% of those sur-
veyed either "somewhat" or "strongly disagreed." We expect that
this can be explained, to some extent, by the fact that felons are, by
definition, a class of individuals that invite closer public scrutiny,
suspicion, and hostility-a class that is already subject to a variety
legal restrictions on their activities 86-but we feel it is interesting,
84. We realize that Democratic legislators do not necessarily step in tune with our
Democratic survey respondents and that they could be motivated by different con-
cerns and interests. Our Study, for example, addressed citizens' normative inclina-
tions-focusing on their principled views and values. But one might expect
Democratic politicians to be much more interested in liberalizing state disenfranchise-
ment policies for one simple, and universal, reason: it is likely to increase their power.
In an unpublished study, Manza and Uggen projected that (for presidential elections,
at least), 70-90% of ex-felons would likely vote Democratic. Chambers, supra note 3,
at 3.
85. In this sense then, our findings run counter to those of Prothro and Grigg. See
Prothro & Grigg, supra note 66, at 291-93. While the parallel is not perfect-their
survey looked at public attitudes toward "rights" (for all) in general and in more
specific examples and our study dealt with public attitudes toward specific and gen-
eral "rights" for one particular category of people-we find it worth noting that we
saw less public support for felons' rights in the abstract and increased support for the
specific right to vote.
86. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 155-58 (1999).
Demleitner offers several examples of "collateral sentencing consequences," includ-
ing, in some cases, "the right to run for or hold office, rejection from jury service,
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given our other findings, that there is this considerable reluctance
to re-admit felons to society as "full citizens."
Along these lines, Professor Demleitner argued that, because of
"collateral sentencing consequences" many ex-offenders in the
United States are essentially "internally exiled."87 We believe our
study of public attitudes regarding disenfranchisement policies,
felons' rights, generally, and the nature and purpose of the criminal
justice system offers evidence to suggest that Demleitner's con-
cerns are, in some respects, warranted. That is, while the public
generally supports the return of the formal political right of the
franchise, we also sense considerable disagreement, overall (but es-
pecially within subgroups: African-Americans versus Republicans,
for example), regarding the appropriate legal and political status of
ex-offenders in society. What this suggests to us is that while felons
may not be "exiled" in a formal sense, they are also viewed, even
after paying their "debt to society" and having voting rights re-
stored, as "second class" citizens, and thus, are not necessarily wel-
comed back into the political community.
What we see in this sense then is almost a "public sentence" that
is tacked onto felons' formal sentences, situating them in a kind of
intermediate socio-political space, somewhere between political
banishment or "civil death" (the denial of voting rights) and genu-
ine inclusion (consensus regarding the fitness and quality of mem-
bers of the political community).88 This public sentence suggests
that felons are "in"-in the contractarian sense that they have been
reseated at the table-but it also underscores a deeper tension with
civic republicanism, in that their tablemates remain suspicious and
are unsure exactly how to address them. In sum, we suggest that
what this uncertainty might represent more than anything is the
janus-faced nature of public attitudes regarding the treatment and
place of felons within the criminal justice system and within our
society, generally. 89
prohibition on certain federal benefits, and the ban on select professional licenses."
Id. at 154.
87. Id. at 153.
88. For a more specific application of this argument, consider the fate of sex of-
fenders who return to their communities after the completion of their sentences.
While the offender may have regained all of her legal rights, she may still be subject
to a series of suspicions, biases, and rules that prevent or obstruct the resumption of
the genuine experience of citizenship within the community. Id. at 158-60.
89. Consider, for example, that while the model response regarding the purpose of
the criminal justice system was "rehabilitation" (overall and for ten of our subgroups),
our Study also tapped into significant degrees of resistance to the idea of embracing
felons as full citizens. Consider, as well, the fact that roughly half of those surveyed
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VI. FUTURE RESEARCH
A future project based on this research involves a more detailed
assessment of the political awareness and culture of the various
states that still maintain laws rescinding ex-felons' voting rights.
We hope to conduct surveys that consider the degree of public sup-
port within particular states, for felony disenfranchisement legisla-
tion, and that assess this level of support in light of the political
culture, history, and tendencies of the various states. Put differ-
ently, do public attitudes within states correlate with the state's
laws and policies? Is the public even aware of these practices?
Moreover, does the degree of support cohere with other political
practices or criminal justice policies within the states?
More specifically, and to recall our most recent electoral contro-
versy, are Democrats in Florida aware of the vote-"dilution"
caused by this law? Do the citizens of Alabama, Iowa, or Nevada
know of and support their states' lifetime disenfranchisement poli-
cies? Is there a correlation between states that have more restric-
tive policies of this sort and a "tough on crime" political culture?
For example, do states that maintain more restrictive criminal sen-
tencing policies, drug laws, or higher per capita law enforcement
budgets, for example, tend to disenfranchise ex-felons to a greater
degree? Is there a correlation between disenfranchisement policies
and such variables as state crime rates, "varieties" of police behav-
ior,9° or support for community policing? Most of twelve states
that maintain categorical or qualified lifetime disenfranchisement
for some ex-felons would typically be considered "conservative" or
"moderate" in their political culture and traditions, 91 yet there are
plenty of "conservative" states that restrict voting rights only while
felons are incarcerated (i.e., Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Utah). What
is the relationship between a state's political attitude (on the "lib-
eral" to "conservative" spectrum) and its disenfranchisement laws?
Can we locate any discernible pattern? We expect that a more fo-
cused and localized study of public attitudes and the political cul-
ture within these states will address these questions and concerns.
felt that felons had too many rights, while nearly half felt they had too few or about
the right amount.
90. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968).
91. See Tbl. 1.
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CONCLUSION
While democratic values, elections and participation, and the
sources and significance of crime are topics of frequent study, until
recently felony disenfranchisement legislation has slipped under
the radar of scholars and policy advocates. What we have done
here is to complement, with the first data of its kind, the efforts of
activists, lawyers, and scholars who are involved in studying the
impact of these laws. As indicated before, our inquiry was initially
driven by basic curiosity: How prevalent are these laws?; What is
the typical justification for them?; What are their origins?; and
What is their impact? What we did not discover in our review of
the existing literature was any data that measured public support
for the disenfranchisement of felons; in short, we located a "gap" in
the literature that called for more study. With this survey of 503
Americans, we have attempted to fill that gap and invite more dis-
cussion and scrutiny of this important topic.
